I have said many times in this blog that Paul Krugman is intellectually dishonest. What do I mean by that? How does intellectual dishonesty differ—if it does differ—from regular old dishonesty? Is it a special kind, with attributes of its own, or is it merely dishonesty in the realm of the intellect?
Let me begin with the concept of an intellectual. An intellectual, as the term is commonly understood, is “a person possessing a highly developed intellect” (The Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide, 1999). The intellect is “the faculty of reasoning, knowing, and thinking, as distinct from feeling” (ibid.). So an intellectual is someone who has a highly developed faculty of reasoning, knowing, and thinking. Intellectuals are thinkers, not necessarily doers. They suppress their emotions because they know from experience that emotions cloud—and sometimes destroy—judgment. Their aim is knowledge, and therefore truth, since truth is requisite for knowledge. John Rawls said that “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” (A Theory of Justice, 3). An intellectual who sought something other than truth would be an intellectual in name only, just as a statesman, legislator, or jurist who sought something other than justice would be a statesman, legislator, or jurist in name only.
The commitment to truth imposes discipline on intellectuals. It rules out any methods that are not reliable in producing truth. It casts suspicion on emotions. It imposes strict standards on the investigation, discovery, analysis, and presentation of facts. It requires logical consistency (for if two propositions are inconsistent, then at least one of them is false). It prefers the simpler account to the more complex account, other things being equal. It prohibits certain fallacies, such as evaluating a belief on the basis of its origin and dismissing claims or arguments on the basis of the personal character of those who make them. It requires charity in interpretation, which means, among other things, giving the benefit of the doubt to one’s interlocutors. Intellectually honest people focus on propositions and arguments, not persons, character, or motives. This is not to say that we don’t or shouldn’t care about persons, character, or motives; it’s to say that these things have nothing directly to do with truth.
We might call the items I listed (which are illustrative, not exhaustive) the canons of intellectual honesty. Those who flout these canons—or even disregard them, however unintentionally—forfeit the right to be considered an intellectual. Intellectuals would rather not persuade at all than persuade by disreputable means. They are process-oriented, not result-oriented. They deny that the end of persuasion—changing people’s minds or behavior—justifies the means. The canons of intellectual honesty constitute a set of deontological constraints on inquiry, analysis, and argumentation. They function like rights in moral and political discourse. They express the view that certain techniques may not be employed, no matter how good the consequences.
I believe that any disinterested reader of Paul Krugman’s New York Times columns over the years will conclude that he regularly flouts these canons. His columns are emotional (often in the extreme); he distorts, twists, and misrepresents facts (as former New York Times ombudsman Daniel Okrent publicly said*); he contradicts himself; he dismisses claims and arguments on the basis of the personal character of those who make them; he fails to draw attention to weaknesses in his positions; and, most importantly, he’s uncharitable. Krugman’s main tactic is to impugn the motives of those with whom he disagrees. His objective seems to be to poison the well, i.e., to turn his audience against the person in question. An honest intellectual would never question the motives of his or her interlocutor. Indeed, an honest intellectual would assume the best motives and proceed to evaluate the actions or policies on their merits. Persons are not arguments. Good people can make bad arguments and bad people good arguments. Inferring “X is a bad arguer” from “X is a bad person” is to commit the ad hominem fallacy.
In short, Krugman’s columns read more like propaganda pieces than attempts to ascertain and disseminate the truth. He is a partisan hack, not a dispassionate seeker of knowledge. He is, as I have often said, intellectually dishonest.
Let me turn to some objections. It might be said that while Krugman is an intellectual, he is not merely an intellectual. Why should his New York Times columns be held to the same standard as his academic writings? Can’t he be a partisan political writer sometimes and an intellectual at other times?
The answer is yes. But Krugman was hired by the Times to write about economic matters, not political, religious, or military affairs.** Presumably, this is because he’s an economist. Economics is a social science (albeit a dismal one). Scientists, as such, are committed to the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge. (The word “science” means knowledge.) I suppose if the Times hadn’t hired Krugman to write about economic matters and didn’t mention his economic credentials in his online biography, there would be no problem with his columns. He would be just another Bob Herbert or Maureen Dowd, both of whom are good writers in the technical sense but neither of whom has any particular expertise or commitment to truth. The Times holds Krugman out as an intellectual. Therefore, whether he wants to conform to the canons of intellectual honesty or not, he is bound by them and properly criticizable when he violates them.
It might also be objected that I—an intellectual—flout at least one of the canons of intellectual honesty on a regular basis. After all, I title my semiweekly posts about Krugman “Bush-Hatin’ Paul.” Isn’t this to question his motives by implying that he’s driven by an emotion (hatred) rather than by a concern for the truth? It is, but notice: I have never dismissed a claim or an argument made by Krugman on the basis that he is poorly motivated. What I have said, repeatedly, is that, to the extent that he hates President Bush, he can’t be trusted on matters that are outside the ken of his readers. Why should I trust someone to tell me the truth on a matter outside my field of expertise when I know that it’s not the truth (or not solely the truth) that motivates him or her? That would be epistemically irresponsible. By referring to Krugman as “Bush-Hatin’ Paul,” I do no more than draw attention to his untrustworthiness. It does not follow from this that everything he says is false or that all of his arguments are fallacious—or that I believe these things.
* "Op-Ed columnist Paul Krugman has the disturbing habit of shaping, slicing and selectively citing numbers in a fashion that pleases his acolytes but leaves him open to substantive assaults" (Daniel Okrent, "13 Things I Meant to Write About but Never Did," The New York Times, 22 May 2005).
** Here, courtesy of Donald Luskin, is the blurb published in The New York Times on 8 October 1999:
M.I.T. Economics Professor To Write a Times Column
The New York Times announced yesterday that Paul Krugman, an economics professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an author known for his theories on international trade and economics, would become a columnist on the Op-Ed page. Mr. Krugman's column will appear twice a week, beginning in January, and will be The Times's first regular Op-Ed column devoted to economics, business and finance.
Mr. Krugman is the author or editor of 16 books and more then 200 articles in professional journals. He has also edited many books on international trade and finance. In recognition of his work on trade, Mr. Krugman received the John Bates Clark medal in 1991 from the American Economic Association.
Mr. Krugman has also written for a broader audience, including a monthly column, ''The Dismal Science,'' for the on-line magazine Slate. And his articles have appeared in publications like Foreign Affairs, Harvard Business Review and Scientific American.
Mr. Krugman, 46, will remain the Ford International Professor of Economics at M.I.T. He received a bachelor's degree from Yale University and a Ph.D. from M.I.T. He has also taught at Yale University, Stanford University and worked as the chief international economist for the White House Council of Economic Advisers.
(Italics added.)