To be a first-year student at the Harvard Law School in the late 1950s (as I was) was to spend a year trying to master unfamiliar materials—namely, common law judicial opinions—with little guidance or feedback. It was the heyday of the Socratic method of legal education. This meant that the casebooks consisted of—cases, with only a little explanatory material. The first-year courses other than criminal law and civil procedure were in common law fields—property, contracts, torts, and agency. The teachers disparaged hornbooks, treatises, articles, and other secondary materials; and most of the students, docile me included, dutifully refused to consult any of these materials. Adept at not tipping their hand, and abetted in this by the students' avoidance of secondary materials and the absence of commercial study aids, the teachers orchestrated debates among students who personified the various fallacies to which lay thinking about the law is prone.
These first-year law teachers were intimidating people. They were not sadistic, but they didn't try to put the students at their ease or wait for a student to volunteer in order to call on him (or her, but there weren't many hers). There were no exams until the end of the entire year, so you couldn't tell how well you were doing. This was a big spur to working hard, as was the knowledge that on the basis of the examination results alone you would be ranked from 1 to 500 and that your rank might have a big effect on your future career. The emphasis of the courses, mirrored by the exams, was not on stuffing students full of rules or case names but on drilling them in fitting factual situations into plausible legal categories, much as medical students learn to fit a set of symptoms into a disease category, and in manipulating the categories in the interest of the client: so the training had both a diagnostic and a treatment aspect. The lesson was the manipulability of the legal categories. Lay people think that the law is something written down in a book. Lawyers learn, in their very first year of law school, that the law is an inference from often ambiguous and even conflicting cases. They learn to be skilled casuists.
(Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory [Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1999], 291-2 [footnote omitted])